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Journal of African Foreign Affairs (JoAFA) Volume 1, Number 2, 2014

About This Edition

ISSN : 2056-5658 (Online), 2056-564X (Print)

Table of Contents :

Africa: Old Habits Die Hard (Editorial Commentary)
Jideofor Adibe, Seifudein Adem and Gani Yoroms 5

Rebel Movements, Militia Groups and the Problematic of Contemporary African Political Leadership
Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa9

Africa has recently been witnessing rising incidents of rebel and militia activities. For a continent whose disparate groups and peoples in many instances were lumped together in single political economy by imperialistic forces, the development undoubtedly poses serious challenge to the political leadership, especially where the continent reeks of acute leadership deficit. Although not exactly a new phenomena while most of the actors are driven by sheer inordinate quest for power, some of the movements have their roots in the politics of exclusion prevalent in many parts of Africa. In the Cold War era, marginalized groups have sought to throw off the yoke of hegemony through coup plot. Anathematization of military regimes in the post-Cold War period appears to have left such groups with no options. The African Union (AU) should support its intolerance of unconstitutional change of power with encouraging politics of inclusiveness among members. It should however devise formulae that will allow for peaceful separation among obviously incompatible groups as a panacea to the increasing rebel and militia activities that have brought untold human and material costs on the continent.

Approaches and Challenges in ECOWAS security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa
Gani Yoroms30

Prior to the efforts embarked upon by the African Union(AU) to set out its security architecture the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) had been inundated with all sorts of security frameworks .These frameworks though focused on security and democratic governance but lack synergy between governance and reform. That is, though there exist security governance structures they are not embedded with the reform of security sector. While the AU acknowledged this lacuna and has been able to perfect and institutionalized its own Security Sector Reform framework but ECOWAS is unable to do so in spite of the fact that it started well- ahead of AU. Never the less it was good that AU achieved this fete as it is expected that it sets the guidelines for all the regional economic commissions in Africa to chart their SSR Frameworks. However, the delay for ECOWAS to complete the task of its security sector reform framework smacked on the legion of complex environment of conflict which it has found itself. This has been exacerbated by serial conflicts by the insurgencies in the sub region which its Mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution lacks the capacity to resolve. For instance the threats of insurgencies in Mali and Nigeria have persisted without concrete approaches to tackling them. Though for Mali crisis, the AU and UN have been able to tackle it with the support of foreign power such as France but the threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria has turned bizarre because the assumption that Nigeria has the capability to tackle the threat without external support has proved otherwise. These are the challenges that ECOWAS faces even as they have impact on the delay for ECOWAS to fashion its SSR framework. The paper attempts to explain the challenges and noted that for a SSR framework to be instituted in a conflict prone environment like ECOWAS it requires exceptional consultations and planning by all the stakeholders.

Amadu Jacky Kaba 55

This paper focuses on Africa’s paradoxes pertaining to meeting its development goals. The paper claims that while one can present a number of examples showing serious challenges confronting countries on the continent in meeting their development goals, one can also present many examples of these same countries making important development achievements, especially in the past decade. For example, the paper shows that the average life expectancy in Africa in 2006 was 53.3 years; in 2014, it increased to 61 years. The average infant mortality rate in Africa in 2006 was 73.5 deaths per 1000; in 2014, it declined to 53 deaths per 1000. The average death rate in Africa in 2006 was 14.2 deaths per 1000; it declined to 9.6 deaths per 1000 in 2014. Africa’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in 2008 was $2,660; it increased to $3,167 in 2013. The paper claims and presents examples illustrating that the African Union (AU) has contributed substantially to Africa’s development achievements in the past decade and argues that if African nations were to give more of their sovereignty to the AU and make it a stronger federal union, it could do more to improve the lives of the vast majority of people on the continent.

Trade and Investment Relations between Nigeria and Russia
Sharkdam Wapmut 73

The dynamics of relations between Nigeria and Russia is best understood from the prism of trade and investment relations between them. The relationship, which began on a low key entered a new phase following the historic support given to Nigeria by the Soviet Union during Nigeria’s civil war (1967-70). This opened the gates for the development of a robust relationship in economic, political, security, social and cultural spheres. The disappearance of ideological differences since the 1990s, as well as the return of Nigeria to democratic rule since 1999, further broadened the space of diplomatic contacts and discussions to explore opportunities for mutually beneficial relations between them. Despite the efforts on the part of both countries to reposition their relationship for mutual benefits, the potential areas for trade and investment between them remain quite huge and untapped due to several unresolved issues such as the case of Ajaokuta project. The paper concludes by recommending that Nigeria and Russia need to move their bilateral relation to a new level of functional cooperation in key and strategic economic sectors, so as to increase both the quantity and quality of trade and investments between them.

Decoding the Discourse on China in Africa
Seifudein Adem93

The burgeoning literature about China-Africa relations has sought to address the inescapable question of whether or not China is a force for good in Africa. But all too often the available evidence seems to lend support to the twin and contradictory claims that China is looting Africa and that it is developing the continent. To put it in another way, on closer examination the ‘reality’ about Sino-African relations, as they are imposed by representational practices, waver between two ideal types. On the one hand, there is a declaration of transformative possibilities (Sino-optimism) and, on the other hand, there is a depiction of doomsday scenarios (Sino-pessimism). Then there is also a sentiment of moderate uncertainties (Sino-pragmatism). This essay offers one perspective on how we could sharpen our understanding of the discourse on China in Africa.

“We [Africans] are particularly pleased that in our relationship with China we are equals and that agreements entered into are for mutual gain.” This statement was made in 2012 by Mr. Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa (Hanauer and Morris 2014:10). Mr. Zuma’s predecessor, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, had also this to say on the same subject six years earlier: “The potential danger, in terms of the relationship that could be constructed between China and the African continent, would indeed be a replication of that colonial relationship”(Eisenman 2012:808). Empirical evidence seems to lend support to the contradictory claims suggested by the two African statesmen: one lauding China for treating Africans like equals and the other virtually implying that China was behaving like a neocolonial power in Africa. We seem not only to welcome such contradictions but even expect them in contemporary discourse.^{^[i]}

Why do contradictory claims about China in Africa co-exist? This is so partly because the knowledge we acquire from this form of discourse is a social knowledge that is based on judgment and interpretation. No empirical fact could tell us more than what an observer/analyst wants to tell us: what s/he thinks had happened, would happen and/or ought to happen. In other words, observation and evaluation are inseparable. In the case of the discourse on China-Africa relations, the problem is particularly compounded by the fact that it takes place both at political and intellectual levels. In any case, sometimes, it is as though the more one reads about China in Africa, and there are many books to read, the less one knows about it.

It is this growing body of literature and the competing claims which thus cry for a disciplinary framework, disciplinary in both senses of that term. What are the divergent perspectives about China-Africa relations? Why are they divergent? What are the driving forces behind them? The answers to these questions could provide part of the syllables that we could assemble for forging such a framework.

In this essay, first, we introduce three perspectives:Sino-optimism, Sino-pragmatism, and Sino-pessimism in the context of the discourse on China-Africa relations. Then, we single out Sino-optimism, the dominant perspective in Africa today, and closely explore it before we subject it to further scrutiny. After we demonstrate that Sino-optimism is based on faulty premises, we suggest, in closing, a seemingly paradoxical conclusion that, in spite of its premises, Sino-optimism is, from Africa’s standpoint, still worth propagating.

A revised “think piece” first presented at SSRC-Yale China-Africa Conference, Yale University, New Haven, November 18-19, 2013. The original title of the “think piece” was “Mapping Knowledge about China-Africa Relations.”

[i] For illustrative case studies see Adem(2013).

The Sun (2014), “China will not pursue colonialist path in Africa-Chinese Premier,” May 1. [Online.] http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=61787 [Accessed on 30 June 2014.]

Book Review:
Harvey C.C. Banda107

[abstract]


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