

**African Union's Silencing the Guns or The Guns  
Silencing Us? Analysing the Implications of Rising  
Armed Conflicts and Terrorism in Africa**

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31920/2050-4306/2026/v15n1a3>

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**Abstract**

This paper investigates the rising profile of armed conflict and terrorist insurgency in Africa against the AU's Silencing the Guns target by 2030. The study examined the AU's 2063 Agenda, which necessitated silencing the guns as a flagship project. The study made use of the security theory to examine and analyse the premise for the 2063 Agenda. Data were collected and analysed from government, intergovernmental and civil society publications. Research data from journals, book chapters, online newspapers websites, government, intergovernmental and civil society organizations reports were consulted during the course of this research. The key finding of this study was that the need to improve both human and state security laid the foundation for AU formulation of the 2063 Agenda. However, though silencing the guns project has recorded some success, the rise in insecurity as a result of armed conflicts and terrorist insurgency

continued to make Silencing the Guns a mere political discussion. Therefore, the study recommended the need to make silencing the guns an aspirational goal as against its current status of a flagship project and the need to adopt non-kinetic military strategy as a tool in combating and fighting terrorism and insurgency.

**Keywords:** *Africa, Africa Union, Africa Union Agenda 2063, Silencing the Guns*

## **Introduction**

Security is one of the dire needs of human beings in different parts of the globe. It is one of the basic and instinctive needs of man (Sharma, Sadana & Kaur 2012). In Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory, though the need for safety and security ranked at the lower level, it is pertinent to note that the achievement of individual, societal and civilizational needs such as social esteem and self-actualization fulfilment and achievements hinged on one achieving and fulfilling their security and safety needs (Sharma, Sadana & Kaur 2012 p.752).

Societies in time past moved from one location to another in search of improved and secured environment which will not only protect them but will preserve them and their relatives. It was the deteriorating global security situation that led to the outbreak of the First World War (Palmer, Colton & Kramer 2007; Rao 2006). In a bid to assuage the impact of the war and prevent future conflict, the League of Nations was formed with the aim of protecting the territorial integrity of member states and "preventing wars through peaceful settlement of disputes among member-nations" (Rao 2006 p.322). That organization was short-lived due to the outbreak of the Second World War and its failure to protect global security. With over 15 million people (both civilians and military men) killed in the Second World War (Palmer, Colton & Kramer 2007 p.858), there was a need to create an institution that will protect and preserve the dignity of human lives. This necessitated the creation of United Nations (UN) which "provided a global institutional structure through which states can settle conflicts with less reliance on the use of force" (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011 p.237). Through its peacekeeping missions and operations, the United Nations have helped in improving the global security and architecture. However, these successes are not without certain challenges such as lack of funds (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011 p.246-249).

However, with the waves of political independence in Africa from erstwhile colonial masters, there was a need to establish a continental body that would help preserve the peace and security of Africa and further consolidate Africa's unity. Consequently, in May 1963, 32 African independent leaders formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Anthony & Ositadinma 2009; Falola et al 1991; Nwankwo 2013; Shillington 2005). However, considering the continued socio-political and economic woes bedevilling Africa, there was a need to transform the organization in order to meet the realities of the changing dynamics of African society. Thus, in 2002 after series of discussions and agreements initiated in 1991, the OAU was transformed into the African Union (AU) in South Africa (Anthony & Ositadinma 2009).

At its fiftieth anniversary celebration in 2013, AU leaders set out to address some of the challenges and successes recorded in the past fifty years in the continent. Hence, they came up with a plan on how to move the continent forward and that gave birth to the AU's Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (AU 2015). Underpinning this lofty agenda are seven aspirations that seek to accelerate African growth and development by 2063, when AU will be celebrating its 100th anniversary.

Unfortunately, achieving the above aspirations will become a mirage if there is no peace and security in African societies and states. This is more imperative because one of the flagship project of the 2063 Agenda is 'Silencing All Guns in Africa by 2020. However, due to the inability of the AU to meet its 2020 target, this was extended to another ten years (from 2021-2030) (Amani Africa 2024). Therefore, it is against this backdrop that the researchers have undertaken this to interrogate the progress of this initiative since it was extended in 2020 to another ten years starting in 2021.

The study is divided into the following sections. First, the introduction followed by the methodology section that seeks to explain the research method that was adopted during the course of this research. The next section, which is the theoretical framework seeks to analyze the theory underpinning this research. Fourthly, AU Silencing the Guns flagship project was examined and analysed. Fifthly, the findings on implications for peace and security before the recommendations and conclusion of the study. The next section will discuss the methodology.

## **Methodology**

This research made use of qualitative methodology. The authors made use of data collected from secondary sources. Our data drawn from a wide range of public sources including official government sources such as state statistical agencies and ministry websites as well as non-government sources such as media reports and databases maintained by organisations such as AU, ACLED were used to develop the content. The guiding research question for data collection was what is the nature of Africa security environment since 2022 and how successful has the silencing the gun project of the AU been? Data collection from the above listed sources emphasised on credibility and relevance to the research question and objectives. The collected data were then synthesized and summarised to develop the findings presented in this study. Equally, journals were consulted, examined and analysed. Documents containing AU's Silencing the Guns road map strategy were analysed. These documents gave an insight into the issue of Silencing the Guns in Africa. The findings were presented on thematic issues that constituted the sub-sections of this article.

## **Theoretical Framework**

This study made use of security as its theoretical basis of analysis. Security as a concept and a field of study (Jackson & Beswick 2018) is broadly divided into two - state and human security. However, before the end of the Cold War, the concept of security was limited to the state largely neglecting the human aspect of security. The two world wars were fought as a result of protecting state security, which focuses on the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states as enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia. State security also known as the traditional approach to security has widened and deepened in recent years from formal security services such as military, police and intelligence to the security of the state which is known as national security (Jackson & Beswick 2018). Thus, at the center of this type of security is the preservation and protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state.

However, since the mid-1990s there have been a paradigm shift from state centric view of security to human security which is often time called the new security agenda (Jackson & Beswick 2018; Roland 2001). This view of security has its origin in Amartya Sen's capabilities studies and the 1994 publication by United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) titled 'Human Development Report 1994' (Alkire 2003; Jackson & Beswick 2018; Roland 2001; UNDP 1994). This form of security aims to protect humans from threats such as hunger, diseases, repression and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life (Odotayo 2016).

Therefore, in order to achieve an encompassing and a holistic security, the 1994 UNDP report outlined that security must include a change "from an exclusive stress on territorial security to much greater emphasis on the people's security" and "from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development" (UNDP 1994 p.24). Thus, to achieve this, human security must be viewed from the following lenses: economic, health, food, environmental, personal, community, and political (Adam 2010 p.99; UNDP 1994 p. 24-25). It should be noted that since the creation of AU in 2001, the organization has been at the forefront of the promotion of human security in Africa (Tieku 2007). Unfortunately, the new wave of armed conflicts, terrorism and insurgency within the African continent has undermined the quest for the securitisation of the continent. This has made the silencing the guns initiative of the African Union very imperative.

### **Literature Review on Silencing the Guns in Africa**

The Silencing The Guns project was launched as a ten-year flagship project aimed at achieving the 2063 AU's Agenda, it took three years before an implementation plan was initiated (Amani Africa 2020; Amani Africa 2024). To improve security in Africa, Africa leaders aim to Silence All Guns in the continent: "all conflicts emanating from ethnic, religious, cultural diversity and all forms of social exclusion will have been eliminated" (AU 2015 p.38). This was to be achieved by 2020. However, it was extended to another ten years (2021-2030) due to the current realities of insecurity in the continent. One of the research questions this study tends to answer is: what is the nature of the security environment in Africa since 2022 when this project was extended?

In 2016 the 'African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020' also known as the 'Lusaka Master Roadmap 2016' was adopted by AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the General Assembly in late 2016 and early 2017 respectively (Amani Africa 2024; AU 2016). This initiative outlined the steps to be taken to silence all guns by 2020. These steps were

grouped into five viz a viz political, economic, social, environmental, and legal (AU 2016 p.3-26). However, due to lack of progress in achieving key results such as addressing the root causes of conflicts in Africa, eradicating recurrent and addressing emerging sources of conflicts, the path to Silencing the Guns remained threatened. The Silencing the Guns project also include maintaining a nuclear free Africa as well as addressing the plights of African refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This project was extended to another ten years with possibilities of progressive reviews (Amani Africa 2020; Amani Africa 2024; AU 2016).

Since the establishment of this project, it has been able to undertake numerous tasks and activities towards achieving its objectives. Amongst these include establishing different structures to implement the Silencing the Guns initiative such as the establishment of the STGIA 2020 Coordinating Unit in the office of the Chairperson of the AU and the appointment of an ambassador as AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa since 2017. The other efforts at attaining the Silencing the Guns initiatives include partnering with other inter-governmental organizations such as UN and European Union (EU) to enhance peace in Africa, direct interventions in specific conflict cases in Africa towards conflict management and resolution as well as the signing of a peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and Trigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in 2022. The Silencing the Guns initiatives has also improved efforts to rid Africa of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) which has led to the declaration of September of each year as 'Africa Amnesty Month'. The initiative has also been promoting democratic governance, good governance and post-conflict reconstruction and development which resulted in AU placing suspension on some members, while supporting reconstruction efforts in member countries like The Gambia (Amani Africa 2024; Okumu et al 2020).

Notwithstanding the above achievements, the issue of Silencing the Guns in Africa has faced numerous challenges such as the interest of external actors (Mlambo 2021), militarisation of African societies as a result of trafficking, circulation and possession of SALWs (Amani Africa 2020), issues bordering on widespread culture of corruption, leadership and governance problems in the continent (Okumu et al 2020) and the crisis of recurring conflicts (Amani Africa 2024). It is pertinent to note that "conflict, violence and

insecurity continue to be major threats to realising the African Union's Agenda 2063" (Okumu et al 2020 p.v). It has been five years since this Silencing the Guns flagship project was extended to another ten years. Unfortunately, terrorism and insurgency are not abating in the continent.

Terrorism and insurgency has witnessed a spark in Africa especially in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2021. There have been a proliferation of terrorist organisations and armed non-state actors in Africa which has led to the rising profile of insecurity in Africa. This has contributed to undermining the achievement of silencing the guns key objectives. In North Africa, terrorism and deaths linked to violent events due to the activities of militant Islamist groups dropped by 32% over the past year (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2023). Irrespective of this, it is germane to note that the war against terrorism is far from been won (Fruganti 2023). In 2022, there was about 276 casualties linked to the activities of Jihadist terrorism in the North African region (Fruganti 2023). Accounting for about 90% of terrorist activities, Egypt is the epicenter of terrorism in North Africa (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2023) ranking 16th among states worldwide most affected by terrorism (Fruganti 2023). In 2022, ISIS, a global proscribed terrorist organisation, attacked Egypt three times (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2023). The last attack which occurred in December claimed the lives of five people (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2023).

**Table 1: Terrorist organisations and non-state actors in Africa**

S/N	Regions	Countries	Names of terrorist organisations and non-state actors in Africa
1.	North Africa	Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, Islamic State, and Polisario Front
2.	Central Africa	Chad, DRC, Central Africa Republic, and Cameroon	Boko Haram, Islamic State in West Africa Province, M23, Allied Democratic Forces, Wagner Group, Africa Corps, Ba Koura, and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
3.	West Africa	Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Benin	Islamic State in West Africa Province, Katiba Macina, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Africa Corps, Wagner Group, Boko Haram, Lakurawa, and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin
4.	East Africa	Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Somalia	Islamic State, Al Shabab, Allied Democratic Forces, and Trigray People's Liberation Front

5.	Southern Africa	Mozambique and Angola	Al Shabab, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda, and Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'a
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Sources: compiled by both authors

In Central Africa terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, Islamic State in West Africa Province, Ba Koura and non-state actors such as Africa Corps and Allied Democratic Forces, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda has remained a source of threat for states and civilians (UN 2021). Boko Haram insurgency has spread from Nigeria to other Lake Chad Basin countries such as Cameroon and Chad, thereby making the group a transnational terrorist organisation.

Terrorism and insurgency in the Lake Chad region which includes both Chad and Cameroon had contributed towards displacing 2.8 million people and currently about 9.7 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2022). The recently released Global Terrorism Index reported that Chad and Cameroon has witnessed decline in terror insurgent activities yet the war is not over (Abass 2024). From its 2024 report on Global Terrorism Index, Institute for Economics and Peace (2024) maintained that Cameroon was among the ten countries accounting for 81% of deaths from terrorism. In 2022 to 2023, Cameroon recorded about 117 deaths attributable to terrorism (Institute for Economics and Peace 2024).

The above shows that Sub-Saharan Africa has become the epicentre of terrorist insurgency and this could be attributed to the rise of terrorism in the Sahel region. Terrorism in West Africa has continued to remain the headline of major national dailies on a daily basis. Particularly, the Sahel region has become an epicentre and theatre of major terrorist activities. West Africa has witnessed the growth and proliferation of terrorist sects which has become transnational in their modus operandi. Out of the 20 deadliest attacks in 2023, West Africa accounted for 13 of them (Institute for Economic & Peace 2024) which represent 65% of these attacks. While in 2024 this rose to 75% which is about 15 of 20 most deadly terrorist attacks (Institute for Economic & Peace 2025). West African countries of Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Mali represented about 46% of the 87% of deaths from terrorism in ten countries while in 2024 it was 47% of 86% of deaths from terrorism by ten countries (Institute for Economic & Peace 2024; Institute for

Economic & Peace 2025). In 2023, West African countries of Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria recorded 772, 270, and 132 terrorist related deaths respectively (Institute for Economic & Peace 2024). Out of the ten most impacted countries by terrorism in 2024 four countries are from West Africa (Institute for Economic & Peace 2025). In 2023, Burkina Faso witnessed a rise in terrorist deaths by 68% compared to 2022 (Institute for Economic & Peace 2024).

The Liptako-Gourma region bordering both Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have become a hotbed for terrorist activities (Egbejule 2025). This has resulted in unrest leading to coups in recent years in West Africa thereby reinforcing the influence and spread of foreign mercenaries such as Africa Corps and Wagner Group. In Sahel region where eight out of its ten countries are from West Africa has witnessed a beehive of extremist violence and armed conflict which in 2024 alone claimed more than 25,000 lives (Institute for Economic & Peace 2025). This region is also known for illicit activities such as trafficking, gold mining, cattle rustling, drug trafficking, kidnapping among others (Institute for Economic & Peace 2025).

East Africa has also had its own fair share of terrorist insurgency. The East African region where the Horn of Africa is located is a very volatile area due to incidents of terrorist groups most prominent been Al Shabab found in Kenya and Somalia. Also local militias has continued to threaten this region. In Kenya Al Shabab has continued to target government installations and key infrastructures especially along its borders with Somalia (ACLED 2024). In late 2024, 10 political violence were linked to armed clash between Al Shabab and Kenya's security forces resulting in about 14 fatalities (ACLED 2024). Even with government renewed effort to root out Al Shabab in Somalia, the latter has continued to cause havoc and mayhem to civilians and government infrastructures (ACLED 2024). In 2024 there were about 1,918 violent events linked to Al Shabab in Somalia (ACLED 2024). In 2023 20 of world's deadliest events, Somalia was ranked 11 due to the 54 people that were killed when Al Shabab attacked a military base housing Uganda soldiers in Bulo Marer, Lower Shabelle region, South West State of Somalia (Institute for Economic & Peace 2024). Of the ten countries that accounted for 87% of deaths from terrorism in 2023, Somalia accounted for 5% of this (ACLED 2024). Out of the 10 countries impacted by terrorism in 2023 and 2024, Somalia ranked 7 in both years (Institute for Economic & Peace 2024; Institute for Economic & Peace 2025). In

2024 Somalia and Kenya were ranked as 3 and 9 in Sub-Saharan Africa based on scores from 2013-2023 by Global Terrorism Index (Institute for Economic & Peace 2024).

In some parts of Southern Africa, terrorism is still present. Although the Cabinda enclave is under Angola, it is located between Congo-Brazzaville and DRC. This region has become a scene of clash by Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda enclave (FLEC), a political-military organisation with the Angola armed forces (Jerry 2020). In early 2025 the Angola government reported of a foiled terrorist attacks targeting oil facilities and the electrical substation in Luanda and Huambo provinces of the country (Prensa Latina 2025). Despite the effort by Southern African Development Community (SADC) to address terrorism in Mozambique through the establishment of Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), terrorist activities are still been felt in parts of Mozambique such as the Cabo Delgado region which has continued to cause havoc to civilians (Tasamba 2024). In April-May terrorists attacked civilians and military personnel alike which resulted in about 60 houses been burnt (Defence Web 2025). In April, 2025 attack linked to Islamic state group killed 10 persons and displaced thousands of people in Mozambique (Greenfield 2025). From 2023-2024, Mozambique recorded 42 deaths attributable to terrorism. Mozambique was ranked 17 and 8 respectively on Global Terrorism Index based on data from 2014-2025 in the world and Sub-Sahara Africa it (Greenfield 2025).

### **Findings on Implications for African Peace and Security**

The continuous armed conflict and terrorist insurgency in Africa presents a lot of multidimensional challenges for nation-building and societal development. Insecurity in Africa has become a testing ground for foreign powers to flex their muscles and plant their strategic interests. Russia through its Wagner group has sought to exert its presence in the geopolitics of the African continent and to challenge Western governments' decades of imperial dominance. Russia's mercenaries are actively present in six countries of Africa namely: Burkina Faso, CAR, Libya, Mali, Niger and Sudan (Bauer et al 2025). While in the ongoing Sudan Civil War which started since 2023.

The surge in insurgent activities have seen them amass and claim territories thereby undermining and weakening the capacity of

government to act and assert its control (Samuel & Stoddard 2025) thereby generating fears amongst its citizens. It is also important to note that the continuous terrorism, insurgency and violent armed conflicts in the continent has led to more deaths and a surge in humanitarian crisis in Africa. The latter directly contributing to migration which could led to increase in internal displacement or surge in refugees.

One of the indirect implications of this widespread illegal gun culture is that that it rubbed the African continent of the bright minds that would have contributed in different ways to nation-building and national development within their sovereign space. Amongst those killed by insurgents and terrorists were 'future' innovators, inventors, entrepreneurs, sport experts among others. Their sudden and preventable death rubbed present and future generations of African men and governments of their contribution to humanity and societal development.

Furthermore, from the study we found that security was at the core foundation of AU's Silencing the Guns. However, the question that still remains is whose security? State security or human security? From our analysis of the AU 2063 Agenda, it was the quest to improve both human and state security in Africa that birthed silencing the guns as a flagship project. However, silencing the guns seems more of a negative peace concept than a positive one. Since the flag-off of this project, it has recorded relative success such as establishing structures to see to the smooth running of the project and the appointment of a High Representative for silencing the guns. This success has been moderate.

However, current Africa's security environment since this project was extended to another ten years (2021-2030) has continued to pose as a threat to it fulfilment. Armed conflict and terrorism has become a stumbling block in Silencing the Guns by 2030. This lofty project risk been one of those African dreams that would not see the light of the day due to insecurity. Silencing the Guns might end up becoming an irony in which the 'the guns will be silencing us' if adequate, urgent and concrete steps are not taken to address Africa's lingering insecurity by state leaders. It should be noted by the sons of discord and violence in Africa that insecurity affect the poor and the rich, developed and developing countries, and weakens every sectors of national economy. Although it impact on individuals, societies and countries varies from continent to continent, its role in undermining

nation-building and national development cannot be over-emphasised. Therefore, there is a need to adopt measures such as non-kinetic strategies in fighting insurgency and terrorism in Africa in order to change the nature of insecurity that is at hand. This is because development is linked to security, peace and vice versa.

## **Recommendations**

There is a need for practitioners, leaders, policy makers to adopt mechanisms that will promote peace and security in the continent. This could be achieved through sustainable road map for silencing the guns. This road map must ensure that the flagship project is moved to one of the aspirations of the AU 2064 Agenda in order to have extensive time to deal with the current gun culture realities that spread the wind of insecurity in the continent. Irrespective of the fact that some progress have been made since Silencing the Guns project was started, this progress mere be seen more strategically as nothing but a drop in the ocean. This project that has few years to end has resulted in little impact on the life of people living in conflict ravages societies in the continent.

Challenges still abound notable among them is the rising profile of armed conflict and terrorist insurgency in Africa since this flagship project was extended to another ten years (2021-2030). If there is anything that history has taught us, it is that real development takes years to materialize and yield fruit. Thus, a ten year plan is not enough as only five years is remaining while the intensity of gun-driven damages remain geometric in the continent. Silencing The Guns should therefore be made the 8th aspiration of the AU 2063 agenda. There is also need for Silencing the Guns to incorporate ending other aspects of violence such as structural and cultural violence. Some have argued that even if all guns were to be silenced, it still would not stop killings in Africa. This is because man will still device other methods of killing without guns, especially in Africa. A good example was during the Rwanda genocide, where most of the deaths were orchestrated through the use of machetes (Okumu et al 2020). Thus, there is a need to invest in uprooting the roots of structural, institutional and cultural violence.

Also, there is a need to invest in positive peace building. Silencing the Guns project look more like a negative peace concept due to emphasis on ending conflicts in Africa. When all wars, armed

conflicts and terrorist activities ends; would it equally end killings in the continent? Therefore, there is a need to invest in human capital development which should be geared towards training youths, women, and the most vulnerable and marginalized groups towards strong peace consciousness. Investing in humans is investing in the future. Poverty is one of the factors that continue to promote conflict and terrorism in Africa. Investing in humans helps to secure a society and move it from insecurity to peace. Also, there is a need to adopt non-kinetic strategies in fighting insurgency and terrorism in Africa. Military might alone cannot win the war against insurgency and terrorism in Africa. This non-kinetic means will help to address the root causes of conflict and help in fostering sustainable peace building. The path to such sustainable peacebuilding will draw strong inputs from critical stakeholders including those at the grassroots or local level. Thus, non-kinetic strategies will help to win the heart and mind of men and contribute to a more peaceful society where everyone feel that we are all connected by a mutual network of destiny where an attack on one, is an attack on others.

## **Conclusion**

This paper has argued that the continuous rise in armed conflict and terrorism in Africa pose a great risk to the attainment of Silencing the Guns, which is part of AU's flagship project. The study maintained that the Silencing the Guns project was extended to another ten years (2021-2030), a duration perceived to be too short by this study.

This study helps policy makers and key AU stakeholders understand what is at stake and how to re-strategise or plan for the remaining five years of this project. This is because the guns are currently silencing us and that is undermining nation-building, national development and the transformation of the continent. Also the concept silencing the guns was examined and it was found that it has recorded marginal success compared to the terrorism that pose as a threat to the achievement of this project. The security environment of Africa was examined and analysed since 2021 which coincide with the year the second ten year plan which was extended took effect. We found that Africa has become the epicenter of terrorism. We then offered strategies such as non-kinetic on how to improve the silence the guns project.

The key findings of this research is that armed conflict, terrorism and insurgency is still a hurdle to achieving this ambitious and lofty

project. The AU states at present seems to lack the capacity for a kinetic end to terrorism due to unavailability of lethal and sophisticated weapons for member countries' armed forces and it members completely lack the political will for a non-kinetic end to terrorism. The Nigerian government seems to have entered into negotiations with bandits terrorising Zamfara communities, yet irrespective of the ongoing negotiations terrorists are still having a free-day conducting their activities in different parts of the ungoverned spaces in Nigeria. In conclusion, there is a need for African leaders, policy makers, stakeholders to go back to the drawing board to fix insecurity in Africa or else the guns will silence us.

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