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China's Key Strategic Interests In The Democratic Republic Of Congo: An Afrocentric Perspective

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Abstract

The growing public debt of Africa to International donors like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) including to big global economies like China, has undermined the development of Africa and renewed global debates on the continent's debt sustainability. It is without a doubt that China is playing an important financier role in the infrastructural development of Africa but at what cost? The current paper aimed to reflect on China- Africa relations and what best shapes China's engagement with individual African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This paper argues that China (also referred to as the Asian Giant) is fundamentally driven by certain aspects of its engagement with the African continent: particularly in the context of the DRC. Such include the *Promotion of credit lines, investment drivers, and access to mineral resources*. Using a document review through secondary materials, the current paper has achieved its objective of discussing China as a pioneer of debt-trap diplomacy in contemporary China-Africa relations.

Keywords: *China, Credit Lines, Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afrocentricity*

Introduction and Background

China-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) diplomatic relations were established on 22 February 1964. Since then, the relations between both countries have developed well overtime. China has progressively managed to help the DRC in the construction of stadiums, parliamentary buildings, hydropower stations, university library, hospitals, and a China-Congo Friendship Hospital (Rapanyane 2021). Several studies have been conducted about China's international relations with the DRC. Among those conducted already include the studies of Wu (2013) and Kushner (2013). Firstly, we need to acknowledge the study of Wu (2013) who made a major contribution to this paper through his online publication titled "*China's Foreign Policy towards Africa*". Wu's study provides insights into the status of the Sino-Africa relationship using a theory of comparative advantage. Although his publication is not based on the current researched topic but around some of the crucial aspects shaping Chinese investment in Africa, Wu in this study argues that China's policy towards Africa has moved from unconditional assistance to mutual benefits which is now a priority. Wu argues that China's policy towards Africa is not only driven by oil and other resources but also the strategic importance of the continent, which is reflected in three considerations, with commercial factors and diplomatic issues standing alongside the resource imperative. Wu stated that some African countries have become critical oil exporters for China as the extreme instability of the Middle East supply has increased. This study is worth mentioning in this paper because it provides a rich existing knowledge of how Chinese foreign policy towards Africa is driven by oil, resource imperative, and Africa's strategic importance. What is more relevant about his study is that it corrects the *naïve* claims which show that Chinese investment in Africa is good. Even though Wu's study concludes with the remarks that China and Africa's cooperation is grounded in mutual respect and complementary trade, it also considers the influence of the developing countries in global affairs, especially on political economy. Despite his contribution, Wu did not channel his views towards the comparison or contrasting of China's foreign policy relations with both Angola and DRC including a broader analysis of major steps undertaken by China when African countries like Angola and DRC default on their loan repayments.

Kushner (2013) also contributed an online report on "*China's Congo Plan: What the Next World Power Sees in the World's Poorest Nation*". Although the report is centered on the new style of investing that is helping Chinese companies take an economic edge over Africa; Kushner has addressed the latter through a win-win game theory. Kushner's study is relevant in this paper because it advances China's DRC strategy. Central to his assessment, Kushner asks that what if China's success in Africa is not fundamentally all that different from the way of Europe, the USA and other western countries have prospered there before? Kushner urges in 1999, China introduced its Policy of 'Go out' which encouraged businesses to go invest outside the country as well as families to open electronic businesses, and restaurants and distribute medicines. Kushner says that when there was an increase in the copper and cobalt value as well as other minerals, a lot of Chinese businesses started their operations abroad such as in the Province of Katanga in the DRC to buy mineral processes dug by artisans in Congo mines. Kushner demonstrated that China saw Africa as a continent of mineral wealth needed for its economy which is driven by Manufacturing. According to Kushner, the DRC has half of the world's cobalt reserves and supplies cobalt with a high grade. These minerals are what drove China to make the largest deal with the DRC in its history known as Sicomines. This deal will ensure that China can extract 6.8 Million tons of Copper and 427, 000 tons of cobalt. Kushner has observed that this new type of investment model led by China took Africa's economic edge and replaced USA as its largest partner in trade. He argues that China will strip the DRC of its natural wealth as did the Belgians in colonial times. Despite the usefulness of his work in understanding the dynamics and implications of Chinese investment in the DRC could be, there was no attempt to project both Countries' historical relations and his report is too narrow to address all other fundamental aspects of both countries' relations such as the key drivers of China's foreign policy towards DRC and a broader explanation of all the trade and economic agreements of China with DRC.

It is without a doubt that the studies invoked above have been very helpful in serving as the stepping-stone for the current secondary-data-based research. Whilst they have all touched on fundamental key themes in the discussion of China's international relations with Africa; they have been very limited in addressing what the current paper is addressing. Such a confined understanding of China's Africa policy has motivated the undertaking of the current research paper. This paper sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of China's international relations with the DRC, looking into the key Chinese national interests in the DRC. It is our considered view that although China engages with Africa at the multilateral level; there are still key strategic interests and/or assets that still shape its international relations with individual African countries like the DRC.

Theoretical Framework

The current paper has adopted the theory of Afrocentricity as an analytical lens. The theoretical lens is most ascribed to Asante (2003) who has assisted in developing it. There are alternative authoritative voices who assisted in shaping the development of the theory including Schreiber (2000), Modupe (2003), and Shai (2016). This theory proclaims that African issues should be addressed by African voices through credible studies which have been conducted using the perspectives of Africans as active participants and subjects instead of observers. It stipulates that Africans ought to be at the center of the analysis of any African phenomenon. All studies conducted in Africa should address African issues and be conducted in all possible ways of the African way of knowledge production. Significantly, African ideas, concepts, and theories should help to shape the studies instead of being marginalized or undermined anyhow (Rapanyane 2022). Therefore, the current research paper has depended on the Afrocentric lens to best interpret the key drivers/ interests of China in the DRC. It is within this context that the tenets of the theory have been deployed to assist in analysing this important topic. Such tenets included cultural centeredness, paradigmatic pluralism, liberation, and cultural agency. For cultural centeredness, no study can outright claim that it has completely understood any African phenomenon if it was conducted from outside to address the African phenomenon. This simply talks of the positioning or placing the authors of the study in the relevant location to study African ideals, values, culture, and history. Africans therefore should assume the mentioned to relocate their thinking from the knowledge production margins and take a step towards assisting. Paradigmatic pluralism seeks to dislodge Eurocentric ethnocentrism as the highest-ranking and place it as a normal perspective existing amongst perspectives including those from an African multicultural context (Schreiber 2000). Liberation and Cultural Agency were adopted to liberate and re-center African minds from the untruths which have been preached for decades. Such may include the Greek civilization mythology. This involves a critical review of the literature to inject African views on epistemology, axiology, and ontology (Schreiber 2000). The operationalisation of the theory is deeply felt by scholars who read to understand how the study is Afrocentric through liberating Africans from any mainstream information that is misleading and was not conducted to free Africans from the knowledge margins. This research paper is Afrocentric also as the scholars who conducted the research paper are positioned well in Africa can derive the real truths of what China is interested in the DRC.

Methodology

Methodologically, the current paper has depended completely on qualitative research methodology. This has involved the use of document analysis which was made up of Journal & periodical articles, website reports, policy and official documents, popular literature, and research reports. The combined documents equaled 40 documents which were analyzed thematically. The authors were not interested in the quantification of the collected information since the results of the research paper were informed descriptively and critically. To produce credible, dependable, and confirmable results, the authors utilised data triangulation and/or triangulation of data.

China-Africa Relations

The involvement of China in Africa goes back to the period of the 1950s. This is the period characterising the African countries breaking away from the colonialism yoke. China's international relations with Africa in modern times were delineated by the former endorsing the African liberation movements that had been in significant stages leading to the independence of most former colonized countries from colonial masters in the 1960s and 70s. Primarily, the support of China was essentially encouraged by ideology, but this would transform over time in the coming decades (Rapanyane & Shai, 2019). A crucial shift in the Chinese-Africa relations dynamics would start in the 1980s when China adopted its "Open door policy". Both geostrategic and economic interests became desired for export to shape the current relations with Africa instead of exporting a particular political philosophy. The potency of the relations also transformed: with increasing political and economic power including huge hunger for resources, China started to open up and re-discover the African continent (Rapanyane, 2020), even though the latter was undergoing major conflicts, structural adjustment politics, mismanagement, and corruption. China then bought about an alternative that is viable for political, social, and economic development formulae to the uni-polar world in the 1990s.

Infuriated by the complicated donor policies and high overhead costs of the multilateral developmental projects, most the African states continued to cherish the alternative presented by China in an increasingly multipolar world. As home to the fifth of the world population, China knows what it meant to be poor and sought industrialisation that would create unprecedented affluence and wealth. Seen to be nothing short of a miracle, China rose through the open door policy with the huge success of the wealth creation formula that was developed and perfected as the internationally recognized "Chinese model" of development (Rapanyane, 2020). Today, China seems to be sharing its successful model, *albeit* special, development and growth techniques with developing countries including African countries. This is practical with the launching of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) paired with the increasing higher participation of African heads of State and governments in the Forum, evident in the promotion of China-Africa partnerships. The presence of a record of 42 African heads of State and Government at the 5th FOCAC conference in Beijing captivated much attention in the international community (Rapanyane, 2020). This growing relationship between China and Africa has prompted unending academic discourse in Europe, Africa, and North America. As part of this general course, businesspeople, economists, historians, politicians, and journalists including others have formed a wide array of different views and opinions.

China- DRC Relations

Within the context of China-DRC relations, it is important to highlight that both countries have had harmonious diplomatic relations and growing economic interrelations since 1971 (Anshan, 2012). Both countries' relations go back to 1887 when the Congo Free State representatives developed contact with the Qing dynasty court ruling China by then. The first treaty between both countries was executed in the year 1898. The Free State became a colony of Belgium from 1908 until it became independent in 1960 and re-established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) which had alternated with the Qing in 1912 but was downgraded to the island of Taiwan which was also a former colony of Japan. In the period after 1949, the DRC recognition was switched multiple times between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Zaire until it finally settled in the latter 1971. In the 21st century, the investment of China in DRC and the DRC exports to China have grown rapidly and they are best defined by the Sicomines deal. Of equal importance is that the DRC has since joined the Belt and Road Initiative in the year 2021 (Adebajo, 2008).

Key Drivers of China in DRC

Promotion of Credit lines

Just like in Angola, the majority of Chinese workers in the DRC are also engaged extensively in the construction sector. Precisely, China has committed to construct a national road in the DRC that would stretch to Kinshasa's central station from the D'jili Airport in Kinshasa through a Sicomines-type barter deal. The actualization of this dream would be economically and/or financially aided by the "China Development Bank credit line" (Rapanyane & Shai, 2019). Jansson (2011: 24-25) also believes that the loans poured into this project would be paid or reimbursed with profits that would be made by the largest deal between both countries (Sicomines).

Complete Realisation of the Sicomines Deal

The Sicomines deal is a by-product of the work of the Chinese SOE known as the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC). CREC is broadly comprehended by international observers as being among the largest international manufacturing companies (Curtis, 2008). The company traversed the Sicomines as it was in the admittance of formulating its game plan of diverseness to flesh out the mineral resource extraction. Two direct institutions are invested with the administration of this deal: "*l'Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux and the Bureau de Coordination et de Suivi du Programme Sino–Congolais*". The Ministry of Infrastructure, Public Works, and Reconstruction are in charge of the Former in all projects that deal with the construction of infrastructure; and the latter administers over the covenant conferences, budgetary side, and surveying including the entire mining project (Jansson 2011: 09). All loans furnished for the Sicomines deal are financed through the China Exim Bank which is operating under the Chinese government as an appointee bureau. The ultimate purpose of China Exim Bank's credit line is to ensure the subsidization of the post-civil war construction in the way of building infrastructure to appear in the best possible terms of endorsing the DRC's economic development (Jansson 2011).

By the year 2011, this deal was hypothesized by both the Bretton woods institutions of IMF and WB to be "atleast 42%, which far exceeds the 25% minimum level required by OECD–DAC." Practically, this implied that in its re-evaluated configuration, all the conditional loans which were furnished through the substructure of the Sicomines did not adhere to the "OECD–DAC's definition of official development assistance" (Jansson, 2011:12; Marysee & Geenen, 2009). Within the context of the initial ingredient of bargaining, the complemental nature of the initial China-DRC trade and Sicomines deal drift is only roundabout (Curtis, 2008). Therefore, under this deal, all the mineral resources mined in the DRC can only be predisposed to the global mineral merchandise and/or straight to China, more like all the alternative Chinese mining corporations in Africa, although this is not explained broadly by the deal (Jansson 2011). Although the Sicomines deal is a by-product of growing China- DRC commercial relations, it still offers several or engulfs several problems. First, there is no equity and transparency. This is made up of the great environment of opacity under which this deal was signed under. That is why it had initially created important complaints from both the global community (more especially western countries) and even within the DRC. The furtiveness that surrounds this deal encouraged the IMF and various other international and local civil society groups to end up requesting that it be made public (Kabemba 2016).

An extraordinary Chinese perspective on this deal postulated by Lee (2010) demonstrates that "it will increase the DRC's potential foreign debt to an unacceptable level and the IMF demanded that it be reduced in size" even though the meeting of this demand took some time. After China Exim Bank reduced the amount of investment from $9 to $6 billion, several vindicated critics argued that the deal was mostly unfavorable to the DRC, although the reduction could not permanently do away with the existing imbalance; but instead worsened it as the other parts of the deal were not revised based on the reduced capital investment from the China Exim Bank (Kabemba 2016). In that way, the capital investment reduction did not lead automatically to the reduction in tonnage or exportation of minerals to China. This situation has created an impression of the meaning of two interpretations relating to the incapacity of the DRC as a compromised State in being accountable especially when it comes to interrogating the deal due to corruption and/or either a symptomatic act of the DRC State that cannot question the complex development of agreements (Curtis, 2008).

Of equal importance is that “neither the Congolese nor the Chinese parties have properly explained how the minerals are to be priced, nor infrastructure is to be built and at what cost” (Global-Witness, 2011). The lack of explanation of the imbalanced benefits to accrue to both China and DRC is of serious disquiet. The intercepted analysis of the deal reveals that the chances of the DRC losing out are very high. One of the issues that might lead to this is the lack of the internal Kinshasa government discussion on the political economy of risks and costs of this very Chinese ambitious investment deal in the DRC (Curtis, 2008). What the government in Kinshasa is only focused on is the deal benefits that came with the increased bargaining power for minerals exchange by recognizing alternative investment sources beyond the normal western investment.

In addition, this deal is a composite of the foreign clause absolving the venture from any new laws that may be instituted by the government in Kinshasa. This simply means that if the DRC reforms its legislation in either customs or tax or even environmental legislation (e.g. mining code), all Chinese companies are to be exempted. In the same context, this deal does not offer any benefits linked to the possible windfall taxes to the DRC and this move has severely exposed the DRC’s vulnerability to the global finance mechanism (Hellendorff, 2011). At the speed of exposing the Congolese government’s deficiency in parleying mining contracts and development agreements; it also exposed the claim of the Asian giant to economic win-win collaboration. As well, China manages the project in its entirety. We have seen the Gecamines (DRC State Company) partnering with the Chinese companies; but it remains a passive partner and does not play any administrative role in the partnership (Curtis, 2008).

This is partly because Chinese companies are in charge of making decisions when it comes to operations, production, importation of equipment, exports, and the use of Chinese personnel in various projects. The foregoing analysis reveals the Sicomines deal as a departure from the models employed by Western countries in Africa, even though not changing the colonial extractivism approach of the West (Curtis, 2008). China's rhetoric regarding a win-win approach to DRC in partnership displays a pure international relation where the pursuit of national interests matters the most, and in which the power partner State establishes itself and dictates the cooperation terms (Kabemba 2016). The intervention of China in the DRC is a preservation of the old extractivism approach that contemplates the DRC as a mineral resources reservoir to be cheaply accessed. The problem in this context may be the DRC which is incapacitated to define, defend and engage its interests globally.

Investment Drivers

Infrastructure

Despite the huge infrastructural investment carried out across the Sicomines agreement framework, the government in Beijing together with the companies have been involved in various alternative infrastructural projects in the DRC. Such included the renovation of the road between the Kavumu and the Bukavu airport within the South Kivu Province which has been moderately financed by donations from Beijing. The contractor was the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) (Jansson 2009). The Sino-Congolese Program administered by the Congolese Agency for Major Construction Works (ACGT) also included a tandem infrastructural project that was initially designed in line with the same barter principles as the Sicomines deal. Topmost, both the Bureau for Coordination and Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Programme (BCPSC) and the ACGT negotiated with Sinosure to finance the renovation of *Kinshasa's Avenue de l'Université*[1]. The contractor in charge of the reconstruction project was the China Guangdong Provincial ChangDa Highway Engineering Corporation (CGCD) and the investment was to be repaid in various chrome and nickel concessions.

Also, both the BSCPSC and the ACGT negotiated with the China Development Bank (CDB) to finance the establishment of the highway between the N'Djili Kinshasa Airport and Kinshasa's central station including the airports' modernisation. This investment was to be repaid

1 This simply means University of Kinshasa

through the cobalt and copper extracted from the Potopoto 2 and Kolwezi 3 concessions in the Katanga Province and CCCC was the project contractor. One unfamiliar feature of the Chinese-DRC relations is that both CREC and Sinohydro have been active in the latter as contractors for various Western and African funding agencies. Sinohydro has executed the construction of various large number of road projects financed by the World Bank. Such as the one between Kimpesi and Matadi; a road between Niania and Beni [upgraded as part of the Sicomines deal); and a bridge in the province of Bandundu. Also, the Sinohdydro signed a contract with the African Development Bank (AfDB) in the year 2008 (Jansson 2009) for the tandem road projects in the province of Bandundu that were both completed in the year 2010. There is also a completed reconstruction project in the artery of Kinshasa, *le Boulevard du 30 Juin* 4 , and this project was financed by both the DRC government and the city of Kinshasa but carried out successfully by the CREC.

Telecommunications

In DRC, there is a huge China-Congo Telecommunications Corporation that was established by the Chinese telecoms equipment provide ZTE Corporation in partnership with the DRC Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPTT) in the year 2000 and it is still in operation (Jansson 2009). This joint business deal is a beneficiary of China Exim Bank's RMB 80 million of concessional finance (ZTE 2000). Although MTN was the leading bidder, (Africa Asia Confidential 2009), ZTE has since though sold its 51% stake in the company to the France Telecom-Orange (ZTE 2011). Additionally, the two Chinese companies of China International Telecommunication Construction Corporation (CITCC) and Huawei have implemented the first phases of the two pioneering projects in support of the MPTT. These projects were financed by concessional loans from the China Exim Bank.

2 Poto-Poto is the name of one of the original residential neighborhoods of the city of Brazzaville, capital of the Republic of Congo

3 Kolwesi is the capital city of Lualaba Province in the south of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, west of Likasi

4 a major 5-km street in Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Forestry Sector

Although not an important feature of contemporary China-DRC relations, forestry is an interesting sector. Within the context of trade, China's share of timber imports remains low although expected to simultaneously increase, not so many Chinese companies have foreign concessions in the DRC (Tidal 2007). There are only the few Chinese companies called the La Nouvelle Société de Bois Yang Shushan which had a forest concession in the DRC especially in the Ingende 5in the Équateur province. This company's concession was granted in the year 2005 and covers 188 672 hectares. As part of this concessional agreement, Yang Shushan has since through the FOCAC pledged to construct a power transmission line between the Bandundu and Mbandaka including a hydroelectric power plant in the Ruki river as part of packaged agreement. Although this concessional project was cancelled at a later stage due to the violation of the DRC's moratorium on the issuance of the forestry titles by the Inter-Ministerial Commission accountable for the review of logging titles (Greenpeace 2008). Since the cancellation of this major deal, no any other historical major deal in this sector has been awarded to any of the Chinese companies.

Access to Mineral resources

It is also interesting to take note of the fact that even though China's arrival in Sub-Saharan Africa was late, its entrance into the DRC was swift and sudden. For example, the investment of China into the country's mining sector rose drastically from 10% to 50% by mid-2013, purportedly encompassing over 90% of the exports from the mineral-rich Katanga province (Economist Intelligence Unit 2013). Since the early 2000s, the active diplomacy of China in the DRC has been part and parcel of the Asian giant's foreign policy which includes the search for commodities in brand-new markets globally and/or abroad, intending to pursue its economic development for the maintenance of its own social and political stability. Minerals remain important for the development of China, which explicates its strong interest in the central African country's cobalt, platinum, copper, diamonds, and manganese ore (UNCTAD 2012).

5 is a town in the Province of Équateur in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the headquarters of Ingende Territory

The collaboration between both countries burgeoned after Joseph Kabila won the 2006 democratic presidential elections and he thus needed investment for the rebuilding of the country. The government in Beijing was seen suitable to assist as the best “alternative” to all forms of Western aid to meet the interests of Kinshasa. This conflux of national interests led to the intensification of economic ties and a cooperative and friendly relationship between both countries. Between 2007 and 2010, a group of Chinese State-Owned enterprises and the government in Kinshasa signed various “resources for infrastructure” deals: several public infrastructural build-up projects financed by loans from China; and to warrant reimbursement, a Chinese-Congolese joint business deal was formulated for the extraction and the selling of cobalt, copper, and gold. Whilst this had initially brought about the brand new opportunity and windows- and even increased room to *maneuver* for the DRC as the Asian giant accorded the Conflict torn country a “competitive leverage” bestowed by its financial amplitude to replace Western aid; and also generated the risk of fabricating a new South-South dependency (London School Economics and Political Science, 2015). China is not only the top buyer in DRC as it accounts for 90% of the entire mineral fuel exports; but sharp in increasing the dependency tactics as observed every year in the increasing of DRC’s exports of copper and base metals to China.

The increasing control of China over the cobalt and copper resources in the DRC could indeed pose a serious threat to all Western and/or European market participants. Based on Roskill's as quoted by the London School Economics and Political Science (2015: online),

> China’s decision to write off debts from the DRC and welcome the country as a new partner for the Belt and Road Initiative is likely to further drive cooperation between the two countries and incentivize more Chinese miners, like China Molybdenum, to make new investments into the Congolese copper and cobalt industry, increasing their ownership in local mines

The DRC is home to over 51% of the world’s cobalt reserves, based on the 2019 data released by the USA Geological Survey. In the year 2020, the DRC has provided an estimated 90kt Co in different intermediates constituting as good as 70% of the entire cobalt feedstock production worldwide (Rapanyane, 2021). Before this, over 40% of the country’s cobalt mining capacity was hitherto in the hands of the Chinese companies due to the decades-long development aid and investment into the central African country, with various 'resource-for-infrastructure' deals having been negotiated and signed since the early 1990s (Rapanyane, 2021). In line with Roskill's as interacted by the London School Economics and Political Science (2015: online):

> On the cobalt refining side, particularly for the production of chemicals suitable for battery applications, China plays an even more dominant role, with its production of cobalt sulphate and oxides accounting for around 80% of the global total output in 2020

Accordingly, China has entered the central African country bearing in mind that it contained roughly half of the global reserves of cobalt and an important portion (10%) of the high-grade copper ore whose value in the international market has enormously increased over the past decade and most of the Chinese MNCs have since flooded the country since the historical landmark election win of Joseph Kabila in the year 2006. It is in this context that scholars would know and understand that with a democratic government in power, a more commendatory environment for the management of resources and validation of the trade deals assisted in attracting most of the Chinese MNC's investment into the DRC. China is now considered the largest investor in the DRC and most the optimists have voiced their views and deliberated how this is most likely to drive the DRC to prosperity and recovery whilst pessimists have argued that the DRC will be stripped of its most resource wealth that could have assisted to uplift the majority out of poverty in exchange for the enrichment of the elite few or Congolese officials (Rapanyane, 2021).

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In this Afrocentric paper, the authors has made significant scholarly contributions to the analysis of China's engagement with Africa in the context of the DRC. It is without a doubt that China has had peaceful relations with Africa since the period of the 1950s although the Chinese relations with the DRC date way back to 1887 the time when China was still ruled by the Qing dynasty. China's international relations with Africa have transformed over time in modern times. From endorsing Africa's liberation movements to signifying an economic win-win. In the contemporary period, the current paper reveals that China is driven by multiple interests in its engagements with Africa and/or the DRC. Such include the promotion of credit lines, finalization of the Sicomines, investment drivers, and access to Mineral resources. Such findings have the potential to infuse multiple scholarly future debates as they are very important and known little. The current paper sought to bring this Afrocentric revelation to the community of scholars and/or academics to accelerate even more debates on this subject.

In this light, African countries like the DRC are advised to be strategic in their deployment of a win-win approach particularly in loan and trade negotiations with multilateral companies. The terms and conditions of loans and aid provisions between unequal power relations (i.e. China with DRC) ought to be made comprehensive and clear to generate an environment of trust among the African partners. African countries (like DRC) should equally develop counter-policy mechanisms that will deal decisively with corruption to promote transparency, access to the information of the government, reform of finance and public administration for enhancement, and the development of anti-corruption monitoring units.

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