Journal of African History, Archaeology and Tourism (JAHAT)
E-ISSN 3049-9623 (Online); ISSN 3049-9615 (Print)
formerly
Journal of African History and Archaeology (JAHA)
E-ISSN 2753-3204 (Online); ISSN 2753-3190 (Print)
Indexed by EBSCO and SABINET
Volume 3, Number 2, December 2025
Pp 65-83

The Historical Development of Sudanese Social Conflict 1983-2025

DOI: https://doi.org/10.31920/2753-3204/2025/v3n2a4

Assoc. Prof. Aydın Aktay
Department of Sociology
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Sakarya University
Email-aydinaktay@sakarya.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0001-9806-3365

&

Esmail Adam Beilo Mcawy
PhD Student
Department of Sociology
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Sakarya University
Email-esmail.mcawy@ogr.sakarya.edu.tr
ORCID: 0009-0006-4389-1650

Abstract

This article aims to show the stages of the historical development of social conflict in Sudan in the post-1983 period, the periods of national rule, and its relations with the British colonial era. The problem of the article is the periods of national rule that inherited the deep-rooted contradictions and divisions between the North and the South, which were originally reinforced by British colonial policies such as the "closed region policy", which included managing each Sudanese region separately and preventing communication between

Territories - the basis for the prolonged conflict and war. The financial support provided by Western Christian organisations to South Sudan during the colonial period contributed to the emergence of a society distinct from the north society. This support continued in the era of national rule, which reinforced the religious dimension of war. Furthermore, the colonial authorities prioritised development in northern Sudan with the neglect of the south, resulting in stark development disparities. Ethnic divisions have become a major challenge to post-independence national governance. The article has followed an approach to investigating and collecting information from many reliable historical sources and linking it to facts at the present time. The article found that colonialism had negative effects in Sudan. These effects were effectively reflected on the state's administration of the national government. It also found the weakness of political leaders to establish a state conservation programme that led to an increase in social conflict. The article concluded that the social conflict in Sudan is the result of the accumulation of several factors, most notably the colonial period, which divided the state into multiple and contradictory identities that led to the conflict. It concluded that the national leaders were weak after colonialism in the administration of the state, and their periods of rule were characterised by administrative corruption, economic deterioration, security challenges, and others.

Keyword: *Historical development, Social conflict, Sudan*

Introduction

The historical development of the Sudanese social conflict in the post-1983 period, is rooted in a set of historical, political, economic, ethnic, religious, and cultural problems and objective causes. These common factors created sharp divisions between North and South (Ibrahim, 2002, p. 15). This is a detailed historical analysis of Sudan's colonial past and its impact on the country's current dynamics. The British colonial policies, such as the Closed Districts Ordinance and the encouragement of Christian missionary activities in South Sudan, significantly contributed to the cultural and political divide between North and South Sudan. The historical context provided helps understand the complexities of Sudan's identity, governance, and conflict. The role of identity in both domestic and cross-border conflicts is particularly noteworthy. Analysing the stages of Sudan's national rule—from its first democracy to its third military governance—highlights the country's persistent challenges in managing diversity and achieving stability. The references to various scholars and historical events add depth to the analysis. Overall, this article offers

insights into Sudan's complex history and its ongoing struggles with identity, governance, and conflict. In this article, we follow a historical fact-finding approach to trace the development of social conflict in Sudan. We examine how the colonial period influenced the period of national rule and how the basic elements of conflict were rooted in the structural contradictions within the state, particularly between the North and the South. This article addresses the historical development of social conflict in general. The history of Sudan is rich and complex, stretching from the Kingdom of Kush (760 BC–AD 350) to the present day. However, the history of independent Sudan begins with the withdrawal of British and Egyptian rulers on January 1, 1956. While the ancient Sudanese kingdoms—including Kush, the Christian states, and the Funj and Fur kingdoms—have drawn the attention of archaeologists and historians, any attempt to understand contemporary Sudan must focus on the events of the past two centuries (Collins, 2008, p. 15). Many South Sudanese intellectuals believe that the roots of the historical problem between the North and the South lie in the formation of two distinct cultural identities: the Arab-Muslim North and the African South. The Arabisation and Islamisation of the North were met with resistance by the South.(Deng, 1999, p. 17). These divisions reflect fundamental differences between the two societies. Differences in identity, which Giddens (2001) refers to as "shared identities," form an important basis for social movements. Identities were delineated geographically: a northern basis and a southern basis. These were fundamentally different and were engaged in a struggle to gain control over the opposing region.Separation and Separatists: Historical Accumulation and Formation of Sudan

Sudan derives its cultural diversity from a vast cultural heritage and a rich historical record. This diversity is rooted in its geography, history, languages, ethnicities, economy, religion, and regional context. The geographical formation of Sudan encompasses diverse climate conditions, terrains, and environments. Rivers and seas, plains and mountains, forests and deserts have all given rise to distinct cultural formations (Bashir, 2005, pp. 74–75). The ethnic dimension is particularly prominent in the crises of the African continent in general—and in Sudan in particular—with its exploitation traceable to the colonial period in Africa. These ethnicities posed major challenges to Sudanese governments in the post-independence period (Ahmed, 2006, p. 50). The region of South Sudan is especially notable for its cultural and linguistic diversity. The everyday linguistic landscape is characterised by the use of

twelve core languages.. There is no single dominant language. Arabic is spoken in a local dialect known as "Arabi Juba," a mixture of local tongues. It is the only language commonly spoken across most southern tribes. English is also spoken, primarily by the educated population. Ethnicity has long been a destabilising factor in Sudan, leaving behind a legacy of wars and prolonged crises after independence. Due to ethnic tensions, the conflict in South Sudan is considered the longest-running civil war on the African continent (Ibid, p. 49).places the region at the heart of the African continent and within the tropical belt, characterised by high rainfall, dense vegetation, and diverse agricultural production. On one hand, this gives the region a positive geopolitical significance. On the other hand, the same geographic features bring high temperatures, humidity, short dry seasons, and the prevalence of insects and diseases—factors that negatively impact human activity. Consequently, the region, much like other areas in the tropical zone, has traditionally been associated with developmental delays and underdevelopment (khartoumspace.uofk.edu, 2021).The people of South Sudan rely on subsistence economics, particularly among the largest ethnic groups—the Dinka, Shilluk, and Nuer. Their primary sources of food include corn, meat, dairy, and fish. To a lesser extent, they also consume wild animals, birds, and edible plants. Corn is the main cultivated crop due to topographical and climatic suitability. Livestock functions as a form of economic insurance in years of poor harvests, making it one of the most vital components of the local economy (Ahmed, n.d., p. 91).

British Policy in South Sudan:

British policy in South Sudan clashed with Islamic religious thought, particularly that associated with the Mahdist revolution, and instead aligned with Western capitalist ideology. The global expansion of capitalist nations in search of colonies was a result of the development of the capitalist system, driven by the accumulation of capital and the pursuit of profitable investment opportunities. The 1884 Berlin Conference marked the beginning of the formal legitimisation of colonial expansion. The agreement stipulated that a European power occupying a territory and asserting control by raising its national flag would be recognised by all other European powers as the legitimate authority there. As part of its colonial strategy, Britain implemented a policy of administrative separation between the North and South of Sudan from 1899 to 1947. This policy also extended to the Nuba

Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile regions. The British justified this separation on the grounds of supposed geographical, political, historical, and cultural differences. To reinforce this separation, the British enacted the Closed Districts Ordinance in 1920, followed by the Passports and Permits Ordinance in 1922. These laws required travellers between the North and the South to carry passports and obtain permission for their movements, including the stated purpose of their visit. In 1925, the British introduced the Trade and Permit Act, which required Northerners to obtain official permission to conduct trade in the South (Ali, 2012, p. 16). Finally, in 1928, the British colonial administration implemented a language policy in South Sudan that officially adopted English as the administrative language. This policy also encouraged the use of local tribal languages and explicitly prohibited the use of Arabic in the region(Ibid, p. 16).

The Law of Closed Areas:

The Law of Closed Areas was part of British colonial policy aimed at isolating the southern tribes from neighbouring Arab tribes. This was pursued through administrative, cultural, and economic means to limit the spread of Arab-Muslim influence from northern Sudan into the South. As part of this strategy, the British administration provided generous financial aid to Christian missionary organisations, which were tasked with overseeing education and health services in the South. These bodies were permitted to receive funding from European church institutions. Among the most active missionary groups was the Verona Fathers, who operated in the Bahr al-Ghazal Province and were instrumental in curbing Arab-Muslim influence (Bob, 2010, p. 43).At the same time, efforts were made to strengthen the ties between South Sudanese provinces and neighbouring British colonies such as Uganda and Kenya. The cumulative effect of these policies was to ensure the continued separation of South Sudan from the North. British colonial authorities organised official conferences for South Sudan in East African locations rather than in Khartoum. Following the establishment of bilateral government institutions, Britain continued to develop and reinforce administrative structures exclusively in Northern Sudan (Ali, 2012, p. 16). The South Sudan Defence Force was established in 1910, parallel to the Northern counterpart, under the justification that the military would have a "civilising" effect. English was the official language of communication within this force. The British also facilitated the entry

of Greek merchants and Christian Levantines into South Sudan. In 1918, the British administration designated Sunday as the official weekly holiday in South Sudan, deviating from Friday, which was observed in the North. English was adopted as the official language, replacing Arabic. Southern leaders were instructed to abandon Arabic names and clothing, which were also banned from markets. To further incentivise cultural alignment with British East Africa, outstanding students were rewarded with opportunities to pursue education in Uganda (Bob, ibid, pp. 43–44). British policy aimed to entrench a cultural and political divide between the North and the South. In 1943, a conference was held in Khartoum to discuss the development of autonomy in Sudan. However, Southern rulers were excluded, expressing dissatisfaction with both the agenda and the process. In 1948, Southern Sudan's inclusion within Sudan's national framework was formally acknowledged after British authorities in Uganda and Kenya advocated for the South's annexation—citing administrative burdens and deep cultural and ethnic differences with their territories (Ali, ibid, p. 16). At the 1953 Sudan Self-Government Conference held in Cairo, Southern representatives were once again excluded. This was due to the absence of organised political parties in the South, unlike the North, which was represented by several Sudanese political factions. This exclusion further deepened the divide between the North and the South (Bob, 2010, p. 56). Colonial powers actively exploited religion to intensify the division between North and South. As noted earlier, Christian missionary activity in the South was encouraged and supported, reinforcing isolation between the two regions in all social, cultural, and institutional aspects. This policy of deliberate differentiation had a lasting legacy on the structure and identity of the Sudanese state following independence independence (Ali, ibid, p. 17).

National Governance and the Problem of South Sudan:

The problem of South Sudan finds parallels in other African nations as well as in several countries around the world. Like its counterparts, the issue is complex, shaped by natural factors related to geography and human composition, historical factors rooted in colonialism, and contemporary causes—most notably, the policy failures of successive national governments since independence (Khalid, 1993, p. 24). Several scholars argue that the inability to effectively manage Sudan's ethnic, cultural, and religious plurality is a key reason for the outbreak of wars in the post-independence period. Ethnicity, culture, and religion—central

elements of collective identity—have played critical roles in Sudan's conflicts. As Huntington (1996) explains:

> Once started, fault line wars, like other communal conflicts, tend to take on a life of their own and to develop in an action-reaction pattern. Identities which had previously been multiple and casual become focused and hardened; communal conflicts are appropriately termed 'identity wars (Huntington, 1996, p. 266).

In Sudan, identity fault lines are evident between the Arab-Islamic identity of the North and the African-Christian-pagan identities of the South. This dichotomy not only contributed to internal tensions but also influenced regional and international dynamics.

Huntington further illustrates this point:

> Sudan regularly helped the Muslim Eritrean rebels fighting Ethiopia, and in retaliation Ethiopia supplied 'logistic and sanctuary support' to the 'rebel Christians' fighting Sudan. The latter also received similar aid from Uganda, reflecting in part its 'strong religious, racial, and ethnic ties to the Sudanese rebels.' The Sudanese government, on the other hand, got $300 million in Chinese arms from Iran and training from Iranian military advisers, which enabled it to launch a major offensive against the rebels in 1992. A variety of Western Christian organisations provided food, medicine, supplies, and, according to the Sudanese government, arms to the Christian rebels" (Huntington, 1996, p. 275).

These dynamics underscore the role of identity in both domestic and cross-border conflicts and demonstrate how South Sudan's prolonged struggle was fuelled by a combination of domestic mismanagement and international entanglements rooted in religious and ethnic alignments.

The Historical Problem:

The Historical Development of Sudanese Social Conflict: It started with the arrival of foreigners to Sudan. The arrival of the Turks and the British before the Mahdist Revolution (1881–1898) did not simply add to the diversity of Sudanese society—it fundamentally transformed the structure of the state through the imposition of new, artificial forms of governance. The Turks and Egyptians introduced elements of Ottoman and Arab civilisation in the 19th century, while the British brought

Western imperialism, education, Christianity, and modern technologies. Each side left its own legacy, layering external institutions atop deeply rooted indigenous traditions (Collins, 2008, p. 15). One of the most consequential colonial policies was the British Closed Districts Ordinance, which involved administering each Sudanese region separately and restricting access between them (Johnson, 2015). Governed almost separately, South Sudan was subjected to measures that barred Northern and other Sudanese traders from the region, intentionally limiting the spread of the Arabic language and curtailing the practice of Islam. This isolation aligned South Sudan more closely with British East African colonies. Importantly, the British showed little interest in developing education and infrastructure in the South, a neglect that persisted up to independence (Young, 2012, p. 23). As a result of these accumulated contradictions, an armed clash erupted in August 1955—just four months before Sudan's formal independence in January 1956. The conflict pitted the successive governments in Khartoum against emerging rebel movements in the South. At independence, the government focused on undoing the effects of the colonial closed districts policy in South Sudan. The state's response was to attempt national unification through compulsory assimilation, promoting Arabisation and Islamisation as tools of national identity.

> This triggered a strong reaction in the South. Southern political resistance quickly escalated into a broader movement demanding emancipation, which later evolved into a full-scale armed struggle for secession (Deng, 1999, p. 19).

National Rule in Sudan and Social Conflict:

The First Democracy (1956–1958):

During this period, Mr. Ismail al-Azhari won the national elections and became the first Prime Minister of Sudan. He was particularly popular among the urban educated classes and the middle class. The first parliament during this phase was the only one to complete its full constitutional term. However, internal disputes within the ruling party—as well as opposition pressure—forced the prime minister to reshuffle the cabinet twice before being overthrown midway through his term in June 1956. This collapse was triggered when the Khatmiyya sect, the second-largest religious group in Sudan after the Ansar sect, split from

his party. The Khatmiyya then joined a coalition government led by Abdullah Khalil of the Umma Party, who was re-elected in March 1958 (Zain El Abidine, 2004, p. 12).

The First Military Rule (1958–1964):

Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud led Sudan's first military coup in 1958, marking the beginning of military interventions in Sudanese democratic life. This era was characterised by significant deterioration in economic and social conditions, particularly for political opponents. The regime adopted repressive policies and curtailed human rights, which eventually led to its downfall through a popular uprising in October 1964 (Abdullah, 2002, p. 77).

The Second Democracy (1964–1969):

This democratic phase was led by Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa, who recognized that one of the key reasons for the downfall of Abboud's military regime was the unresolved South Sudan issue. This period also coincided with the rising influence of African solidarity, particularly from countries such as Egypt, Algeria, and Nigeria. The most notable achievement of this stage was the adoption of a regional governance system, which included the creation of a legislative and executive council for South Sudan. This marked a significant step toward addressing southern grievances. However, the inability to fully implement the agreements reached in political dialogues—and persistent failures in resolving detailed developmental issues related to South Sudan's service and infrastructure—undermined the progress. This democratic period ended with another military coup in 1969, which was heavily influenced by Egypt's July Revolution (Habibullah, 2005, p. 387).

The Second Military Rule (1969–1985):

This period began with the Nimeiri coup in May 1969. Upon seizing power, Jaafar al-Nimeiri issued a declaration that explicitly acknowledged the cultural and historical differences between the North and the South. This recognition was positively received by Southern rebel leaders. The resulting rapprochement led to the Addis Ababa Conference in 1972, held in the Ethiopian capital, which culminated in the signing of a peace agreement in the Ethiopian capital. Under this accord, southern Sudan

was granted extensive autonomy, and former rebel leaders were integrated into the Sudanese national army (Habibullah, ibid, p. 388).
In his analysis of identity-based conflicts, Huntington (1996) observes:

> If the war continues for any length of time, the demands of the insurgents tend to escalate from some form of autonomy to complete independence, which the government rejects" (p. 292).

He further adds:

The war in Sudan, for instance, which began in 1956, was brought to a halt in 1972, when the parties were exhausted. The World Council of Churches and the All Africa Council of Churches—through what remains a virtually unique achievement by non-governmental international organisations—successfully negotiated the Addis Ababa Agreement, providing autonomy for southern Sudan." (p. 292). A decade later, however, the government abrogated the agreement, the war resumed, the goals of the insurgents escalated, the government's position hardened, and all efforts to negotiate a ceasefire failed. Neither the Arab world nor Africa had core states with the interest or influence to pressure the parties. Mediation efforts by Jimmy Carter and various African leaders failed, as did those of an East African committee consisting of Kenya, Eritrea, Uganda, and Ethiopia. The United States, due to its antagonistic relationship with Sudan, could not act directly, nor could it request assistance from Sudan's close allies such as Iran, Iraq, or Libya. Ultimately, it turned to Saudi Arabia, but Saudi influence over Sudan was limited" (Huntington, 1996, p. 293). President Nimeiri's regime was marked by political failure, administrative disorder, and widespread institutional corruption. These issues severely damaged the national economy and led to the gradual collapse of the state (Khalid, 1993, p. 590). His rule came to an end in April 1985 through a popular revolution (Eliom, 2017).

The Third Democracy (1985–1989):

This period was led by Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi of the National Umma Party, in coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party. During this time, rebel movements controlled approximately 80% of the territory in South Sudan. Meanwhile, the central government in the North failed to meet the basic needs of citizens and was unable to repay foreign debts due to

the deteriorating economy. The prime minister reshuffled the government four times during this period due to administrative inefficiency and ineffectiveness (Zain El Abidine, 2004, p. 16). In February 1989, a group of military officers submitted a memorandum to the prime minister urging an end to the war and a commitment to peace. The political situation in the country was dire, and the relationship between the army and the civilian government was marked by deep mistrust. These tensions culminated in a military coup in June 1989 (Woodward, 1990, p. 250). In an interview conducted in 2025, a leader of the National Umma Party stated that the failure of the third democratic period stemmed from the military's dominance over national security and their dissatisfaction with civilian rule (A.H., Interview, 2025).

The Third Military Governance (1989–2019):

The National Islamic Front (NIF), which had been participating in the government at the time, orchestrated the coup against the democratic system in June 1989. Once in power, the NIF began systematically replacing civil and foreign service officials with its own members (Abdullah, 2002, p. 83). The Front concentrated power in a council that it claimed represented constitutional legitimacy and national consensus. Meanwhile, political parties and trade unions were suspended, press freedoms were suppressed, public gatherings were banned, and many non-affiliated workers were dismissed from their positions (Khalid, ibid, p. 267). This era was marked by extensive political and societal failures. In 1999, a major split occurred within the Islamic Front itself: one faction was led by coup leader Omar al-Bashir, and the other by Hassan al-Turabi, the ideological architect of the coup (Abdullah, ibid,p. 83). Eventually, the regime collapsed in April 2019 following a mass popular uprising driven by worsening economic conditions. After the fall of the regime, a transitional agreement was reached between civilian and military leaders, calling for a 39-month transition period followed by general elections (Al Sudan Centre for Press Services, 2019). However, the transitional period faced numerous challenges: the failure to achieve comprehensive peace, deteriorating foreign and regional relations, issues with illegal immigration and border security, continued influence of the former regime, partisan power struggles, the displacement crisis, refugee issues, and high population pressures. These obstacles seriously hindered the transition process.

Post-2019 Transitional Period: Governance, Social Conflict, and Societal Repercussions:

In December 2018, widespread protests erupted across Sudan demanding regime change. These demonstrations—later known as the December Revolution—led to the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019.After the fall of the regime, the military and security forces maintained tight control, obstructing the democratic transition (Mai Hassan & Ahmed Kodouda, 2019). Although protesters remained mobilised in front of the General Command of the Army, demanding a civilian government, the military resisted and violently dispersed the sit-in, resulting in dozens of deaths. Despite this, public demonstrations continued until the African Union intervened in August 2019, helping to mediate the formation of a transitional government composed of both military and civilian representatives for a 39-month period. On October 3, 2021, the transitional government signed a peace agreement in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, with four armed factions representing Darfur, Blue Nile, and Eastern Sudan. However, just weeks later, on October 25, 2021, the military seized power again, dissolved the civilian cabinet, and detained the prime minister. Although public pressure forced the military to reinstate the prime minister on November 21, 2021, he resigned in January 2022 due to continued military dominance over governance (https://l24.im/udFaEkM, accessed 10.06.2025).

Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights:

During the civilian-led transitional government (CLTG), domestic and international human rights organizations generally operated without significant government restrictions. They were able to investigate and publish findings related to human rights abuses. Government officials were often cooperative and receptive to their reports, although some restrictions remained, particularly in conflict zones. After the military takeover, human rights groups expressed growing concern over potential government retaliation. There were instances where United Nations and NGO humanitarian access was restricted in regions such as North Darfur and East Jebel Marra, officially due to insecurity. However, critical observers posited that the actual reason was the state's strategic objective to limit external scrutiny within geographically or politically sensitive

areas. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that administrative procedures remained inconsistent and complex, varying between federal and state authorities and among different states. These bureaucratic obstacles significantly hindered aid agencies from delivering timely and effective humanitarian assistance (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Sudan, 2022, p. 22).

Failures of the Transitional Period (2019–2021):

The second year of Sudan's democratic transition was plagued by political instability, which slowed progress on human rights and rule of law reforms. The economic crisis further exacerbated public dissatisfaction. The transitional government failed to implement critical institutional and legal reforms stipulated in the August 2019 Constitutional Charter, including the formation of a transitional legislative council and commissions tasked with addressing peace, transitional justice, and anti-corruption efforts.

In response to rising criticism, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok announced a political initiative in June to address the national crisis, with a particular focus on security sector reform. On September 21, 2021, authorities announced that they had thwarted a coup attempt in Khartoum, reportedly involving officers linked to former President Omar al-Bashir's regime (hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/sudan. 12.6.2025).

Parties to the Conflict (2023 Onwards):

Following the 2021 coup, Sudan was governed by a military council led by two rival generals:

1. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan – head of the armed forces and de facto president.
2. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti") – leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The two generals clashed over the transition to civilian rule. The main point of contention was the integration of the RSF (approx. 100,000 fighters) into the national army and the issue of who would command the unified force. Observers suspected that both generals were reluctant

to relinquish power, wealth, and influence (Beverly Ochieng, Wedaeli Chibelushi & Natasha Booty, Sudan War: A

Simple Guide, BBC, 13.06.2025).

Foreign Interference in the Ongoing Sudanese War: Regional and International Involvement:

According to Reuters and UN expert reports, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have received support from neighbouring African countries, including Chad, Libya, and South Sudan, throughout the ongoing conflict. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been repeatedly accused of supplying arms to the RSF. Although the Gulf nation has firmly denied any involvement, both the United Kingdom and the United States issued appeals last year urging external actors—especially the UAE—to cease backing Sudan's warring parties.

In contrast, reports suggest that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have received Iranian-made armed drones, which allegedly played a role in helping the army regain territory in and around Khartoum (Ochieng & Booty, ibid., 14.06.2025).

Efforts: African Union's Mediation

The African Union (AU) has undertaken a series of mediation initiatives guided by its AU Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns in Africa. These interventions aim to resolve the conflict in Sudan through regional cooperation and coordinated diplomacy. The AU convened key actors and neighbouring states at the ministerial level, issuing a collective call for an immediate cessation of hostilities. These efforts evolved into an expanded mechanism intended to align and coordinate all conflict resolution initiatives in Sudan. During the High-Level Dialogue, participants emphasised the importance of persistent, united action and called for an inclusive Sudanese-led political dialogue. This dialogue aims to create the foundation for a consensual civilian transitional government capable of addressing the root causes of the ongoing conflict (African Union, The Sudan War Calls for Our Relentless Collective Action, AU Report, 16.06.2025).

Impact on Food Security and Social Welfare The ongoing war has drastically worsened food insecurity, which was already a critical issue before the conflict began. According to Khalid Siddig, Senior Research

Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), "In 2022, before the conflict began, only half of the population reported being food secure. Since then, the proportion of food-secure urban households has plunged from approximately 54 percent to just 20 percent."

Despite an increase in overall humanitarian assistance, 76% of the population reported receiving no aid at all during the conflict. Instead, most people reported relying on personal networks—family, friends, and community members—rather than on formal government institutions, international aid organisations, or domestic civil society groups (The Socio-Economic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households, National Urban Household Survey, 16.06.2025).

Results:

The article concluded that the social conflict in Sudan originates from ancient roots linked to the evolution of its governing structures. The colonial period of the British forces witnessed policies that resulted in the deepening of the gap between the north and the south. Many of the Sudanese elites see the periods of foreign rule introduced by new Western techniques and technology that have focused on the regions of northern Sudan, As a result of disparity at the level of society, it led to an increase in social conflict in the post-independence periods.

There is a common opinion on the general Sudanese of all social levels:

The British policy known as the "Split Manage" was present throughout the colonial period, through which South Sudan was ruled separately from Sudan.

The Arabic language was isolated from the south, the Arabic names were prevented, and the northern merchants were prevented from entering South Sudan. This policy impeded the normal communication between the people of the same country.

We conclude that the social conflict resulted from the differences and contradictions between the components of one state (north and south). National governments deepened the conflict after independence in the pursuit of power and control. Although the social, economic, and cultural differences between the North and the South are clearer, the North, as a stand-alone component, is also not without differences and contradictions. This led to rebellion and war in the Nuba Mountains and South Blue Nile, It was known as the second civil war since 1983 until

the peace agreement was signed in 2005. The Darfur region in western Sudan has witnessed the social conflict since 2003.

Conclusion:

Both parties to the conflict in Sudan—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—have reportedly committed gross violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including actions that may amount to war crimes and possibly other serious crimes under international law (UN Report, 9.5.2025, p. 15). The intensity of the hostilities and the consistent lack of compliance with humanitarian and human rights standards are alarming. While further investigation is required to determine the full scope of crimes committed, it is evident that entrenched impunity has not only enabled the outbreak of conflict but has also sustained it.

Breaking this cycle of violence and impunity is impossible without accountability, regardless of the perpetrator's rank or affiliation. The conflict has been further fueled by systemic discrimination and inequality, often along ethnic and tribal lines, posing a significant risk to Sudan's future stability, as well as to regional peace and security (UN Report, 30.05.2025, p. 15).

Civilians remain caught in intense fighting between the SAF and RSF. Humanitarian organisations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), report treating injuries from explosions, bullets, and stabbings. An estimated 8 million people have been internally displaced, with an additional 3 million seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.

MSF highlights that while malnutrition treatment and vaccination campaigns continue to be priorities, their implementation is increasingly hampered by supply shortages, insecurity, and attacks on healthcare facilities and personnel. Despite these challenges, MSF teams are currently active in 11 of Sudan's 18 states, providing emergency medical care and basic humanitarian services (MSF, 15.06.2025).

According to the Small Arms Survey, any meaningful diplomatic or humanitarian strategy must acknowledge that both main belligerents have strategic interests in prolonging the conflict: the SAF aims to fragment the RSF over time, while the RSF's operational structure is rooted in continuous expansion. In this context, long-term planning that priotises Sudan's real democratic forces is essential.

Books and Articles

Abdullah, A. (2002). elsudan elwahadoh am eltamazzaq (al-Fatih al-Tajani, Trans.). Beirut.

Ahmed, A. (2006). enfesal ganob elsudan weatharoh aaly elaaman elqomi elmasry. Arab Information Office.

Ahmed, A. M. (n.d.). fy tarih elanthorobologia waltanameyah fy elsudan (Mustafa al-Gamal, Trans.). Africa and Arab Research Center.

Ali, S. M. (2012). tashkil elidologiyah elsiyasiyah walkhartah elgokrafeyah elsudaniyah. Journal of Sudan Studies, Khartoum University.

Bashir, M. (2005). moshakelah eldalah elsudaniyah gadaya washkaaliat elbana elwatani. M. O. Bashir Center.

Bob, A. M. (2010). ganob elsudan gadal elwahadoh wa elienfesal (2nd ed.). Azza Publishing House.

Collins, O. R. (2008). tarih elsudan elhadith (Mustafa Magdy El-Gammal, Trans.). Jazirat El Vard Library. (Original work published in English).

Deng, F. (2001). siraa elrowaa (Awad Hassan, Trans.). Center for Sudan Studies. (Original work published 1995).

Giddens, A. (2001). Sociology (4th ed.). Polity Press.

Habibullah, M. O. (2005). eltagarabah elsiyasiyah fy elsudan monzu arbaain aaman. Journal of International Policy, (161), Cairo.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Simon & Schuster.

Ibrahim, A. (2002). elharab elahliyah wafaras elsalam fy elsudan. Bilimsel Kitaplar Yayın ve Dağıtım Evi.

Johnson, D. (2015). qanon elmanateg elmagafoloh (Naji Babiker, Trans.).

Khalid, M. (1993). elnakbah elsudaneyah wademan elfashal (Part One). Dara Al-Amin Publishing.

Woodward, P. (2002). elsudan eldalah elmodtariboh 1898–1989 (Muhammad Ali Jadin, Trans.). M. O. Bashir Research Center. (Original work published 1990).

Young, J. (2014). elsudan siraat elmasalih warahanat elmaseer (Ahmed Gamal Abu al-Lil, Trans.). Line Publishing House. (Original work published 2012).

Zain El Abidine, A. (2004). eltagareb eldimaqrateyah fy elsudan elnagahat waliekhfagat. Journal of Research, International African University, Khartoum.

Report

Interview with A. H., a leader of the National Umma Party. (2025). Khartoum.

Websites and Reports

African Union. (2025, June 16). The Sudan war calls for our relentless collective action: High level dialogue on Sudan concludes. https://l24.im/i7fMv58

Al Sudan eliom. (2020, February 25). https://alsudantoday.com/

Altakaya. (2025, June 17). iirth sufiun yasudu ramaq aljaweaa fi alsudan. https://l24.im/LPkjA

Booty, N., Ochieng, B., & Chibelushi, W. (2025, March 12). Sudan war: A simple guide to what is happening. BBC News. https://l24.im/DO26KvN .

Craze, J., & Makawi, R. (2025). The Republic of Kadamol: A portrait of the Rapid Support Forces at war. https://l24.im/bu7XErJ

Human Rights Watch. (2022). World report 2022: Sudan. https://l24.im/1QowbLu .

Mai Hassan & Kodouda, A. (2019). Sudan's uprising: The fall of a dictator. Journal of Democracy. https://l24.im/EHWRks .

Médecins Sans Frontières. (2025, June 15). Since April 2023, we've shifted our humanitarian efforts in Sudan to respond to people's emerging needs from the ongoing conflict. https://www.msf.org/conflict-sudan.

Small Arms Survey. (2025). Rapid Support Forces: Briefing paper. https://l24.im/B6EmlV .

Socio-Economic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households. (2025, June 16). https://l24.im/YdjRco.

United Nations. (2025, May 9). UN Document G24/029/24. https://l24.im/pdFNoPr .

United Nations. (2025, May 30). UN Document G25/001/95. https://l24.im/feLD8bW .

smc.sd. (2020, February 23). Sudan opens new page: Signature date. http://smc.sd.

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/sudan. 12.6.2025.

Al Jazeera. (2025, February 11). Sudan: Scene of world's worst humanitarian crisis - African Union. https://l24.im/du2n .